We present a method for making use of past proof experience called exible re-enactment (FR). FR is actually a search-guiding heuristic that uses past proof experience to create a search bias. Given a proof P of a problem solved previously that is assumed to be similar to the current problem A, FR searches for P and in the \neighborhood" of P in order to nd a proof of A.
INTRODUCTION Introduction
Automated deduction is essentially a search problem that gives rise to potentially in nite search spaces because of general undecidability. Despite these unfavorable conditions state-of-the-art theorem provers have gained a remarkable level of performance mainly due to (problem-speci c) search-guiding heuristics and advanced implementation techniques. Nevertheless theorem provers can hardly rival a mathematician when it comes to proving \challenging" theorems. The main reason for this fact is also a major shortcoming of theorem provers: Unlike humans, theorem provers lack the ability to learn. Learning, however, is a key ability in any form of human problem solving, in particular in theorem proving. The necessity to equip theorem provers with learning capabilities has been recognized quite early. But learning for theorem proving causes much more di culties than learning in other areas of arti cial intelligence because the premise that \small changes of the problem cause small changes of its solution" is not ful lled at all. As a matter of fact, in theorem proving tiny variations of a problem speci cation can result in signi cant changes of the solution (proof). This circumstance complicates matters substantially. Learning methods based on analogous proof transformation (e.g., 3], 2], 12], 16]) basically attempt to transform a known proof (source proof ) of a problem solved previously (source problem) into a proof (target proof ) of a given problem to be solved (target problem). Mostly, the mainly deterministic transformation procedure centers on some kind of analogy mapping obtained by comparing source and target problem. The transformation may include abstraction and planning steps. Occasionally, a little search may be involved in order to patch failures of the deterministic transformation procedure (e.g., 2]). The prevailing determinism (and restricted forms of search if any) has the advantage that analogous proof transformation can be quite fast. The downside, however, is that source and target problem have to be very similar so that the source proof can be transformed into a target proof mainly with deterministic actions. For this reason, methods based on analogous proof transformation are preferably applied to inductive theorem proving. There, the inherent proof structures (base case, hypotheses, induction step) provide a suitable platform for such methods. However, for general (deductive) theorem proving in domains without any (recognizable) structure, these methods appear to be inappropriate. An alternative approach to learning for theorem proving is to incorporate past problemsolving experience into the search-guiding heuristic (e.g., 18], 21], 7], 10], 6]). That is, when solving a target problem, the source problem is in some way exploited by the search-guiding heuristic. The theorem prover still conducts a search, but the heuristic is biased towards a certain area of the search space depending on the source proof and on the way the source proof is utilized by the heuristic. This approach has the advantage that the demands on similarity between source and target problem do not have to be as high as for methods based on proof transformation. Naturally we incur the usual overhead of search caused by exploring areas of the search space that do not contribute to the proof eventually found. (A \suitable" choice of the source problem|a general di culty for all learning approaches|and a suitable method for heuristically utilizing the respective source proof can of course reduce the overhead considerably.) In this report we investigate a method for incorporating past proof experience into a search-guiding heuristic called exible re-enactment (FR). FR basically attempts to reenact the source proof via search, if possible. Flexibility is achieved by also searching in the \neighborhood" of the source proof or by using some \standard" (non-learning) heuristic if the trace of the source proof is (temporarily) lost. Both re-enactment and exibility are combined in a monolithic structure that allows for shifting smoothly between exibility and re-enactment depending on the search space encountered.
FR was rst introduced in 10]. In this report we present a systematic experimental evaluation of FR that illustrates its performance and range of applicability. Furthermore, we counter a frequent and unjusti ed criticism of FR, namely to be a costly disguise for adding the source proof (in the form of lemmas) to the axiomatization of the target problem. But rst, section 2 explains some basics of our view of automated theorem proving and introduces some concepts necessary for FR. Section 3 describes FR and discusses some of its properties. Experimental studies are reported on in section 4. Finally, a discussion in section 5 concludes the report.
Theorem Proving
Theorem provers can attempt to accomplish a task in various ways. We focus here on theorem provers that may be referred to as saturation-based theorem provers. This type of theorem prover is very common and is employed by provers based on the resolution method (e.g., 4]) or the Knuth-Bendix completion procedure (e.g., 1]). The principle working method of such a prover is to infer facts by applying given rules of inference, starting with a given set Ax of axioms, until the goal G (the theorem to be proved) can be shown to be a logical consequence of Ax. A proof problem A is hence speci ed by A = (Ax; G ).
The prover maintains two sets of facts, the set F A of active facts and the set F P of passive or potential facts. In the beginning, F A = ; and F P = Ax. In the selection or activation step a fact 2 F P is selected, removed from F P , and put into F A unless there is a fact The search-guiding heuristic H is pivotal for e ciency. The quality of H can be measured in terms of redundant search e ort. The sequence S 1 ; : : :; n of facts activated by H describes the search behavior of H. Assuming that such a search protocol S represents a successful search, the last fact n of S concluded the proof. By tracing back the application of inference rules starting with n we can identify all those facts that actually contributed to concluding the proof. These facts are called positive facts and are collected in the set P of positive facts. The remaining facts constitute the set N of negative facts and represent redundant search e ort. The set P obtained when solving a source problem represents past proof experience.
It is utilized by FR as described in the following section in order to reduce redundant search e ort.
3 Flexible Re-enactment Similarity between two proof problems A and B can occur in many variations. One possible kind of similarity is that a considerable number of the facts that contribute to a proof of A are also useful for proving B (or vice versa). This means in our terminology that the associated sets of positive facts share many facts. FR attempts to exploit such a similarity.
Assuming that a target problem A T and a source problem A S are similar in the way just described, it is reasonable to concentrate on deducing facts when attempting to prove A T that also played a role in nding the source proof of A S , namely the set P S of positive facts. When proving A T , FR prefers a 2 F P (by giving it a relatively small weight FR( )) if \bears signi cant resemblance" with a fact in P S . Such a is called a focus fact. Depending on how strong the preference of focus facts is, FR will activate focus facts as soon as they appear in F P and give little attention to other facts while there are focus facts. (If all source axioms occur in the target axiomatization, this essentially means that FR will re-enact the source proof.)
Although we assume the proofs of A T and A S to share many positive facts, a few of the facts useful for proving A S may lead to focus facts that do not contribute to the proof of A T eventually found. Besides the redundant search e ort caused by these irrelevant focus facts, the crucial di culty is to nd the (non-focus) facts not needed for proving A S , but necessary for proving A T . These \missing" facts have to supplement the relevant focus facts, i.e., the focus facts that do contribute to the target proof. It is very likely that the missing facts are descendants 1 of relevant focus facts considering that the relevant focus facts already established the core of a proof and that there are only a few steps needed to conclude the proof. It is reasonable to assume that \taking the reasoning process a few steps further in the direction given by the focus facts",
Details of FR
i.e., that also preferring their descendants will be pro table. Immediate descendants should be preferred the most. In the sequel we give a formal de nition of FR.
For the de nition of FR the notions`di erence' and`distance' are pivotal. First, we de ne the di erence di between two facts and 0 to formalize the notion`focus fact'. di ( ; 0 ) = ( 0; < 0 100; otherwise. For the time being, we content ourselves with this simple de nition of di erence that centers on subsumption. Note that the values 0 and 100 are somewhat arbitrary but intuitive hints of percentages, denoting \perfect similarity" and \no similarity at all", respectively. As we shall see, the restriction of di to IN 100 = f0;1;:::;100g entails that all further computations will produce values from IN 100 which makes computations more transparent. di is used to nd out whether a given fact is a focus fact. The remaining task consists in designing FR so that it o ers a reasonable degree of specialization in (i.e., focus on) the source proof that is paired with an acceptable degree of exibility, i.e., the ability to cope with a target problem with a proof that requires minor to moderate deviations from the source proof. The use of d already provides sufcient specialization by directing the search towards the source proof. Its rudimentary exibility can be enhanced by combining it with some \standard" (\general purpose") heuristic H.
Among several sensible alternatives we picked the following:
The parameter p controls the e ect of d( ) on the nal weight FR( ). d( ) will be dominant if p = 0. In this case, if d( ) = 0, FR( ) will also be 0 regardless of H( ). As p grows, H increasingly in uences the nal weight, thus mitigating the in exibility of the underlying method, namely using d( ) alone as a measure for the suitability of a fact . For very large p, the in uence of d( ) becomes negligible, and FR basically degenerates into H.
Range of Applicability
FR is most suitable in situations where each source axiom is \covered" by a target axiom, i.e., for each source axiom 0 there is a target axiom so that < 0 . Then FR can conduct a search guided by the source proof in the sense that FR can re-enact the source proof (or a more general proof) without search since, for each positive fact, there will be a focus fact subsuming it. The re-enacted source proof or, more precisely, the focus facts constituting the source proof, can serve as a basis for nding the target proof by searching in the \neighborhood" of the source proof, i.e., in particular by focusing on immediate descendants of focus facts (cp. subsection 4.2, case 1). (If additionally the source goal S subsumes the target goal T then plain re-enactment will succeed.) Under these conditions it is also possible to add the positive facts as lemmas to the target axiomatization, because it is known that every logical consequence of the source axioms is also a logical consequence of the target axioms. Therefore, FR has often been mistaken for a costly disguise for adding lemmas. However, adding lemmas creates kind of a \ at" structure as opposed to a more hierarchical structure when using focus facts and the notion of distance. In other words, when simply adding lemmas we have an enlarged set of axioms on the one side and their descendants on the other side. FR, however, imposes a kind of ordering on descendants, essentially giving immediate descendants top priority. (See also subsection 4.2.)
But FR is also useful in case source and target axiomatizations do not agree \obvi-ously", i.e., agreement (logical equivalence) cannot be checked with simple (syntactic) subsumption criteria. Under these conditions it is not sound to add the positive facts of the source proof to the target axiomatization because it is not known whether they are logical consequences of the target axiomatization. In subsection 4.2 we shall see that FR performs quite well when target and source axiomatizations do not agree obviously, regardless of whether target and source goal agree (i.e., S < T ) or not.
So, FR is very versatile and covers a wide range of applicability. Nevertheless we want to point out that FR does of course not prove useful if source and target problem are not \similar enough", i.e., the sets of positive facts do not share enough facts. In other words, there are too few relevant focus facts that do not su ce to supply the core of a target proof. In addition, too many irrelevant focus facts hamper the search. (Naturally, relevant and irrelevant focus facts can only be identi ed at the end of a successful search.) In this case focusing on the source proof will be counterproductive. Hence it is important to nd a suitable source problem. This di culty is not addressed in this report (see 11] or 5] instead). Here, we want to show that|when given a suitable source problem|FR allows for solving target problems that pose serious di culties or cannot be handled at all without FR.
Experiments
We conducted our experimental studies with a theorem prover for problems of condensed detachment (CD). For the experiments we used the theorem prover`CoDe' that realizes CD based on the concepts introduced in section 2. CoDe has a standard (\general purpose") heuristic W at its disposal that computes the weight W( ) of a fact 2 
Experimental Results
We examined FR in the light of problems LCL040-1 through LCL072-1 (problems 1{ 33 in 14]) and problems LCL109-1 through LCL116-1 (problems 55{62 in 14]). These problems have the property emphasized in the preceding subsection which is important for learning, namely to o er a varying degree of di culty that ranges from rather simple to challenging. They are a part of the public TPTP problem library ( 20] ) version 1.2.1. In the following we shall examine the three interesting cases regarding the axiomatizations and the goals of target and source problems A T = (Ax T ; T ) and A S = (Ax S ; S ):
1. The same axiomatization (Ax T = Ax S ), but di erent goals ( S 6 < T , T 6 < S ); 2. Di erent axiomatizations (Ax T and Ax S may share some axioms, but it is not the case that one axiomatization is part of the other), but the same goal ( S < T );
3. Di erent axiomatizations and di erent goals;
(We omit the fourth case \the same axiomatization and the same goal" because then plain re-enactment su ces and always succeeds in a negligible period of time.) Note that only for case 1 it is sound to add positive facts of the source proof as lemmas to Ax T . Therefore, we shall consider this possibility only for case 1. The results of FR are given in the correspondingly labeled column. The entries display run-time (approximate CPU time in seconds obtained on a SPARCstation 10) and the number of activation steps (i.e., the length of the search protocol) in parentheses. This number gives us a rough idea of the search e ort. (The length of the search protocol usually does not correlate well with the length of the proof eventually found. This is also not an issue here since we are only interested in some proof, not necessarily a short one.) Column`FFU' shows the \focus fact usage", i.e., the share (relevant) focus facts have of the target proof, given as an approximate percentage. Column`RFF' shows the share which facts that account for relevant focus facts have of the source proof. This value hence gives us an idea of how many facts of the source proof proved useful for nding the target proof. Consider, for instance, target problem LCL071-1 and source problem LCL070-1. The target proof consists of 20 facts. 15 of the 20 facts are focus facts. Hence, FFU is 15=20 = 75%. These 15 relevant focus facts go back to 15 facts in the source proof. Since 16 facts constitute the source proof, RFF is 15=16 94%. The values of RFF listed in table 1 indicate that it is important that RFF is rather high. Given case 1 (equal source and target axiomatization) this is understandable considering that the share 100% ? RFF of the source proof will de nitely give rise to irrelevant focus facts that may disarrange the search. Large values of FFU indicate that a large part of the target proof goes back to re-enactment and hence could be found rather e ciently. When adding the positive facts of the source proof as lemmas to the axiomatization of the target problem, CoDe employed W with c = 2 and c w = 1 to guide the search.
(This parameter setting turned out to be generally useful during the experiments reported on in 8].) The results of utilizing lemmas in this manner are listed in columǹ lemmas'. The entries again show run-time and length of the search protocol. The entry`|' signi es that no proof was found in an \acceptable" period of time (one hour). A slight modi cation of lemma usage is to assign the weight 0 to all axioms (including added lemmas) so that they are immediately activated. Column`lemmas ' shows that this modi cation is crucial in order to make adding lemmas competitive. The improvements are understandable because we can thus coerce re-enactment and hence simulate the obviously pro table re-enactment part of FR. Nonetheless, table 1 does not reveal any signi cant advantage of adding lemmas compared to FR. As a matter of fact, adding lemmas can cause a failure when FR still succeeds (cp. target LCL068-1, source LCL069-1). An opposite observation (failure of FR, success of adding lemmas) has so far not been made. This leads us to conclude that the \hierarchical" search ; y) ; y)) ? 10 10 8 , 2 ] i(i(i(x; i(y; x));z); z) ? 12 11 4 , 9 ] i(i(i(i(x; y); y);z); i(x;z)) ? 15 12 4 , 3 ] i(i(i(x; y); z); i(i(n(y); n(x));z)) ? 16 13 12 , 10 ] i(i(n(x); n(i(y; i(z; y)))); x) ? 17 14 7 , 13 ] i(n(n(x)); x) ? 18 15 3 , 14 ] i(x; n(n(x))) ? 19 16 9 , 3 ] i(i(i(i(n(x); n(y)); i(y; x));z); z) ? 21 17 4 , 4 ] i(i(i(i(x; y); i(z; y));u); i(i(z; x); u)) ? 22 18 11 , 17 ] i(i(x; y); i(i(z; x);i(z;y))) ? 23 19 18 , 15 ] i(i(x; y); i(x; n(n(y)))) ? 24 20 17 , 16 ] i(i(x; i(n(y); n(z))); i(x;i(z;y))) 58 21 4 , 14 ] i(i(x; y); i(n(n(x)); y)) 148 22 20 , 21 ] i(i(x; n(y)); i(y; n(x))) 233 23 4 , 19 ] i(i(i(x; n(n(y))); z); i(i(x; y);z)) 234 24 23 , 22 ] i(i(x; y); i(n(y); n(x))) CoDe to prove problems quite fast which it could not handle with W and one of the two mentioned parameter settings. (There are, however, two di erent and very problem-speci c parameter settings for problems LCL068-1 and LCL071-1 that make it possible to prove these problems with W. See 8] .) Figure 1 displays the proof of LCL114-1 found by FR using source LCL113-1 as a typical example of case 1. The proof listing shows (from left to right) the number of the activation step, the number of the proof step, the ancestors in brackets, given as numbers referring to previous proof steps (or a blank space for axioms), and the facts themselves. Focus facts are marked by`?'. The identical axiomatizations of target and source make it possible that a large initial part of the target proof (FFU = 20=24 83%) consists of focus facts. This part also constitutes the main part of the source proof (RFF = 20=22 91%) and is found very e ciently with only four redundant activations. Three of the four (non-focus) facts necessary to conclude the proof can 11s 18% 82% 26s be considered to be \in the neighborhood" of the source proof since they have at least one ancestor that is a focus fact. The nal proof step is no di culty since a fact subsuming the goal is given the weight 0 and is therefore activated immediately (cf. subsection 4.1). Experiments regarding cases 2 and 3 are summarized by tables 2 and 3. These tables are organized like table 1 without the columns concerning lemmas since the soundness of adding lemmas is|as mentioned earlier|not guaranteed for cases 2 and 3. As a matter of fact, for case 2 adding lemmas is completely pointless since the goal itself would be added as a lemma.
Considering tables 2 and 3 we can again observe that FR allows CoDe to solve problems rather quickly which were out of reach when using W. The two bottom rows of table 2 indicate that FR can also cope with situations where large parts of the target proof go back to quite a small part of the source proof (i.e., large FFU, but rather small RFF). Note that|due to di erent axiomatizations|it is not necessarily the case that the share 100% ? RFF of the source proof entails irrelevant focus facts. The results concerning problems LCL042-1, LCL058-1, and LCL060-1 in di erent roles as source and target problems (cp. tables 1 and 2) reveal that (quite expectedly) FR is not \symmetric". That is, a proof of a problem A found by FR when using a source problem B does not guarantee to nd a proof of B when using A as source. (Recall that di erent axiomatizations at the beginning usually only allow for re-enacting very small parts of the source proof. In gure 2 only two axioms are \re-enacted".) The \trace" of the source proof can be picked up (to a certain extent) later on when more and more focus facts appear. Figure 2 is a perfect example for the exibility of FR stemming from the integration of W that here basically prepares the ground for re-enactment. This is kind of opposite to the situation in gure 1 where W together with the preference of descendants account for concluding the proof while the groundwork is done by re-enactment. 
Discussion
We presented a method called exible re-enactment (FR) that exploits past proof experience with heuristic means. When searching for the (target) proof of a given proof problem, FR attempts to re-enact a given source proof essentially by searching for the facts that constitute the source proof. Flexibility is achieved by also searching in the \neighborhood" of the source proof, i.e., by also preferring descendants of the facts constituting the source proof. Experiments have demonstrated that FR allows for solving problems that could not be handled before. The similarity between the source and target proof required so that FR or in other words a \ exible, search-based re-enactment of the source proof" can succeed is basically re ected by the number (or percentage) of facts constituting the source proof that are also useful for a target proof: the more, the better. But such a kind of similarity can only be assessed a posteriori. Hence, a priori similarity can only be estimated with \heuristic indicators" such as, for instance, the percentage of source axioms that are also present in the target axiomatization. Simple, easy to check criteria like this can already produce remarkable results (cp. 11]) which supports our belief that selecting an appropriate source problem can be automated reasonably (see also 5]). Naturally, in order to be independent of symbol names, methods for nding a suitable renaming of symbols must be available (cf. 5]). Thus, for FR similarity is kind of a \loosely" de ned notion that perforce cannot and does not play as important a role as it does, e.g., in 12]. There, similarity is a clearly de ned central notion, but|probably a common trade-o |restricts applicability. FR is not limited to the use of just one source proof. The design of FR allows us to exploit an arbitrary number of source proofs. But the usefulness of more than one source proof is questionable (\a jack of all trades, but master of none"). Redundant search e ort might become a problem that outweighs possible advantages like having available more focus facts which undoubtedly increases the chance of having the \right" ones. Nonetheless, exploiting a pool of proof experience rather than one piece also has certain advantages (cp. 6] where sophisticated abstraction techniques are used). Finally, FR can of course also be employed for proof checking and proof completion. Proof checking essentially corresponds to plain re-enactment. Proof completion means that the given positive facts represent the \skeleton" of a source proof with a few intermediate steps missing. Under these conditions the positive facts will give rise only to relevant focus facts. Thus, FR can search for the missing intermediate steps without being confused and possibly misguided by irrelevant focus facts which makes things easier than in general applications of FR.
In 23] the hints strategy (HS) has been investigated as to its usefulness for proof checking, proof completion, and also for proof nding. Hints basically are the counterparts of the positive facts of a source proof. HS and FR have commonalities, but also have di erent features and design concepts. In order to search for (or complete) a proof with certain properties, HS also allows for avoiding (instead of focusing on) hints|a feature that was not an objective when designing FR. But when it comes to searching for a (target) proof without such constraints, FR subsumes HS in particular because of its ability to deal sensibly with non-focus facts that are descendants of focus facts, thus exploiting a source proof beyond mere re-enactment|a concept not present in HS.
